Siblings\u27 Rights to Visitation Post-Adoption by Meza, Esther Denise
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2014
Siblings' Rights to Visitation Post-Adoption
Esther Denise Meza
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Meza, Esther Denise, "Siblings' Rights to Visitation Post-Adoption" (2014). Law School Student Scholarship. 529.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/529
MEZA 1 
 
Siblings’ Rights to Visitations Post-Adoption 
I. Introduction 
The social and emotional significance of sibling relationships has grown in recognition as 
a result of social science research and is reflected in legislation on both the federal and state 
level. In addition, courts have acknowledged the lifelong adverse effects that legally severing 
these relationships could have on children particularly those in foster care situations.  Despite 
their significance, children in out-of-home care are frequently separated while under State 
care and can be adopted by separate families post termination of parental rights.  While both 
state and federal statutes exist aimed at nurturing and preserving sibling bonds during 
children’s stay in foster care placement, none provide for continued contact post adoption. As 
a result, siblings entering foster care with preexisting relationships to one another face the 
additional trauma of not being able to remain in contact with one another post adoption.     
Some advocates argue that siblings have a constitutionally based liberty interest to family 
privacy grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause or the First Amendment 
freedom of association, and as such, are entitled to continued contact and visitations in the 
post adoption context. However, to date no court has recognized nor denied these interest and 
many seem to direct this issue to the legislative process.  Additionally, even if such interests 
were recognized, they are not likely to be absolute or protect children in foster care from 
being ultimately separated before and post adoption.
1
  Just as parental rights to family 
autonomy are subject to State interference when the health, safety and welfare of children are 
                                                          
1
 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (“[N]either rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are 
beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict 
the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other 
ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of 
conduct on religion or conscience.”). 
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at issue, so too are siblings’ interests likely to be limited by those State interests, especially 
since they are particularly implicated in the foster care context.  
This paper will consider the rights of children in the New Jersey foster care system to 
continued contact post adoption with their siblings who might also be in a foster care 
placement, “aged out”2 or already reached the age of majority at the time of the State’s 
intervention.  The scope of this paper is limited to children with already existing sibling 
bonds at the time they enter State care as it is a rather broad topic generally warranting 
varying considerations.  The paper will explore this issue by looking at both past and recent 
New Jersey case law, U.S. Supreme Court decisions as well as some of the constitutional 
arguments posited in support of sibling relationships in the post adoption context.  
II. Current Status in New Jersey  
 In New Jersey, a child in foster care placement has a statutorily protected right to 
continued visitation with his siblings unless the Division of Child Protection and Permanency 
(Division)
3
 opposes such contact.  In cases where the Division does oppose familial contact, it 
bears the burden of showing that the visitation would endanger the health, safety, and welfare of 
the child.
4
  In a recent case, D.C., the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a foster mother's 
unwillingness to facilitate visits between foster children and their siblings did not overcome the 
                                                          
2
 Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare 101, Child Welfare Facts Sheet, 
http://www.casey.org/Newsroom/MediaKit/pdf/CWFactSheet.pdf (last visited 4/26/13) (“Aging out is when a youth 
in foster care becomes a legal adult.”). 
3
N.J.S.A. 9:3A–10 (In July of 2012,  Governor Christie signed legislation reorganizing the Department of Children 
and Families by, among other things, transferring certain services for youth from the Department of Human Services 
to the Department of Children and Families, which included the Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). In 
addition, DYFS underwent a name change and is now called the Division of Child Protection and Permanency).  
4
 New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. J.Y., 2013 WL 362764 at 9-10 (citing In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545 
(2010)). 
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presumption of the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act
5
 (Child Placement Act) that children in 
out-of-home placements should continue to have regularly scheduled visitations and contacts 
with their siblings.
6
  The Child Placement Act enumerates, among other rights, a child’s right to 
be placed in the same home with his siblings and have continued visits with them in the event 
they are placed in separate homes or programs.
7
  
The D.C. court found that by not fractionalizing a child’s placement period into pre and 
post termination, the Legislature recognized that there is nothing about the legal act of 
terminating parental rights, in itself, “that magically alters the child’s day-to-day life or that 
would justify cutting off pre-existing sibling contact.”8  And as such, the Court noted that the 
Division continues to have an affirmative obligation to nurture sibling bonds, whether or not the 
process is initiated by a sibling, and whether or not their parents’ parental rights have been 
terminated.
9
 
According to the Court, the Child Placement Act’s requirements are a reflection of 
constantly evolving legislation created in response to the changing understanding of social 
                                                          
5
 In 2008, President Bush signed into law the Fostering Connections Act, a funding statute, which included a 
provision on sibling placement that declared “states must make reasonable efforts […] to place siblings removed 
from their home in the same foster care, kinship guardianship, or adoptive placement, unless the State documents 
that such a joint placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings; and […] in the case 
of siblings removed from their home who are not so jointly placed, to provide for frequent visitation or other 
ongoing interaction between the siblings, unless that State documents that frequent visitation or other ongoing 
interaction would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings.”  Randi Mandelbaum, Delicate 
Balances: Assessing the Needs and Rights of Siblings in Foster Care to Maintain Their Relationships Post-
Adoption, 41 N.M. L. REV. 1, 67 (2011) (quoting  Pub. L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 
(West 2010)).  
6
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 565-66. 
7
 N.J.S.A. § 9:6B-4(d),(f) (“A child placed outside his home shall have the following rights, consistent with the 
health, safety and physical and psychological welfare of the child and as appropriate to the individual circumstances 
of the child's physical or mental development: (d). To the best efforts of the applicable department to place the child 
in the same setting with the child's sibling if the sibling is also being placed outside his home; (f). To visit with the 
child's sibling on a regular basis and to otherwise maintain contact with the child's sibling if the child was separated 
from his sibling upon placement outside his home, including the provision or arrangement of transportation as 
necessary.”). 
8
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 564-65. 
9
 Id. at 564-65. 
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conditions.
10
  The Act provides in relevant part that a child who is placed outside the home has 
“certain specific rights separate from and independent of the child’s parents or legal guardian by 
virtue of his placement in another residential setting” and therefore, “the State has an affirmative 
obligation to recognize and protect these rights.”11  The Child Placement Act has been viewed as 
an express attempt by the Legislature to help micromanage the maintenance of sibling 
relationships because they are considered to be highly important to the health, safety and welfare 
of the children involved.
12
  The Court found that the Act is intended to ensure that the Division 
continues to work on nurturing these bonds throughout the children’s entire placement period, so 
that they have that continued source of support “from the beginning to the end of their 
odyssey.”13  “That responsibility inheres even after pre-adoptive placement, which may or may 
not come to fruition.”14 
Post adoption however, preexisting sibling bonds lose their presumptive legal 
significance in the children’s lives and must instead be proved according to a legal standard.  The 
Court clarified that its opinion in D.C. was not meant to be “an incursion on the deeply-
embedded right of fit parents, biological or adoptive, to raise their children without outside 
interference.  That right is well-established, and the parens patriae
15
 exception that has been 
                                                          
10
 Id. at 562-63. 
11
 N.J.S.A. 9:6B-2(a), (b). 
12
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 563-64 (quoting William Wesley Patton, The Status of Siblings’ Rights: A View into the 
New Millennium, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 21 (2001)). 
13
 Id. at 564-65. 
14
 Id. 
15
  Matter of D.K., 204 N.J. Super. 205, 222 (Ch. Div. 1985) (citing Matter of Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 259 (1981) (“The 
parens patriae power of our courts derives from the inherent equitable authority of the sovereign to protect those 
persons within the state who cannot protect themselves because of an innate legal disability. While traditionally used 
to protect the economic and property interests of the legally disabled, it has also been invoked to protect personal 
rights. In divorce and child custody cases, for example, our courts exercise parens patriae jurisdiction to protect the 
best interests of children. The chancery courts also utilize their parens patriae powers when a juvenile has committed 
a criminal offense, or when a person has been committed to a psychiatric institution.”)). 
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recognized for half a century is narrowly tailored to avoid harm to the child.”16  So, although the 
Court held that siblings may petition for visitations with their brothers or sisters in foster care 
placement post termination of their parents’ parental rights, consistent with its prior decisions on 
“open adoptions,”17 it declined to outright extend the Child Placement Act’s presumption beyond 
the pre-adoption context.  In essence, the court established the point at which a child’s day-to-
day life is altered and cutting off pre-existing sibling contact will be justified, at least in the legal 
sense.   
After a child has been adopted, the Court will not exercise its constitutional parens 
patriae jurisdiction over a parent’s fundamental right to raise their children as they see fit, absent 
a showing that it must do so to protect the child from harm.
18
  Post adoption, newly formed 
families are legally afforded the same familial autonomy, privacy and limitations that biological 
families are entitled to.
19
  Therefore, only “to the extent that visitation by a third party may be 
compelled over the objections of a biological family, the same rule applies to an adoptive 
family.”20  In New Jersey, this means once a child in foster care placement has been adopted, 
neither she nor her biological siblings will have the benefit of the Child Placement Act’s 
presumption in favor of continued contact and visitations.  Instead, the presumption that the 
adoptive parents will act in the adoptee’s best interest is given priority and unless they are 
                                                          
16
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 575-76 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166-67 (1944)); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (“So long as a parent adequately cares 
for his or her children (i.e. is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm 
of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that 
parent’s children.”).  
17
 In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, 492-493 (N.J. 1994) (“An open adoption occurs when, prior to 
the adoption, it is agreed in writing that the child will have continuing contact with one or more members of his or 
her biological family after adoption is completed.") . 
18
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 571-72. 
19
 Id. at 570-71. 
20
 Id. at 570-71. 
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deemed unfit or act against the child’s best interests, the State should not intervene.21  And so, 
the sibling bonds which were presumptively necessary to the health, safety and welfare of the 
children lose their order of legal importance and their significance must be validated via court 
proceedings.  Siblings are then required to secure a visitation order under the Grandparent and 
Sibling Visitation Statute (Visitation Statute), where they will have the burden of demonstrating 
to the courts by a preponderance of the evidence that discontinuing the visitation would be 
harmful to their brother or sister.
22
   
In an earlier case, In re the Adoption by W.P. and M.P., the court found that the Visitation 
Statute would conflict with the New Jersey Adoption Act if it were applied post adoption since 
the Legislature specifically rejected the proposed open adoption provisions when the Adoption 
Act was amended in 1993.
23
  The provisions rejected by the Legislature would have provided: 
With the consent of the adopting parent the court may provide in the 
adoption order for visitation or other type of communication with the child after 
the adoption by any person who had a relationship with or was biologically 
related to the child. This provision may be modified by the court subsequent to 
the adoption on petition of the adoptive parent for good cause shown. 
24
 
                                                          
21
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Reno v. Flores, 
507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)).  
22
 N.J.S.A. § 9:2-7.1(a) as amended by L. 1993 c. 161, § 1 (“A grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this 
State may make application before the Superior Court, in accordance with the Rules of Court, for an order for 
visitation. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of 
visitation is in the best interests of the child.”). 
23
 In re Adoption by W.P. and M.P., 163 N.J. 158, 172-73 (2000) (In that case the child’s grandparents petitioned the 
Court for continued visitations post adoption of their grandchild, the Court held that the statute did not apply in that 
context because it would conflict with the statutory intent of the Adoption Act.).   
24
 Id. (quoting A. 1418 § 13(d), 205th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1992)).  
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It was the Court’s view, however, that even if those provisions had been enacted by the 
Legislature it would not have provided continued visits or contact with the adoptees without the 
consent of the adoptive parents.
25
 
The Court found that the legislative intent of the Adoption Act was to “creat[e] a new 
family unit without the fear of interference from the natural parents” and that by emphasizing the 
“complete termination of the biological parents’ rights [it] also logically had the effect of 
terminating the biological grandparents’ rights to visitation.”26  Once adopted, the child becomes 
the child of the adoptive parents and part of their extended family.
27
  As a result, the Court 
reasoned, the primary purpose of the termination is to protect the adoptive parents’ autonomy in 
raising their children and protecting them from future disturbances by the natural parents.
28
    
Approximately 3-years later, the Visitation Statute underwent constitutional scrutiny in 
Moriarty v. Bradt in light of the guideposts set out by the U.S. Supreme Court’s plurality in 
Troxel.
29
  In order to save the statute from constitutional infirmity, the Court added the threshold 
harm standard providing the “special weight” required by Troxel for a fit parent’s visitation 
determination over a nonparent’s challenge.30  The Moriarty court concluded that the applicable 
standard, in cases where a third party seeks visitation over the objection of a fit parent, is the no 
                                                          
25
 Id. 
26
 In re Adoption by W.P. and M.P., 163 N.J. 169-70.   
27
 Id.  
28
 Id. at 173-74. 
29
  See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (In that case the paternal grandparents petitioned the 
courts under a Washington statute for continued visitations with their grandchild.  
[O]ur world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational relationship 
would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit 
parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at 
least some special weight to the parent's own determination. 
 Id at 70).  
30
 Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 108-09 (2003) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 69.). 
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harm standard and not the best interest standard that had been applied by the lower court.
31
  In 
the Court’s view, because the Visitation Statute implicates parents’ constitutional rights to raise 
their children as they see fit, application of the best interest standard did not afford adequate 
protection for fit parents’ privacy rights because it did not always require proof of harm.32  By 
contrast, the no harm or “exceptional circumstances”33 standard does require that the petitioning 
party show by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of the visitation sought would cause 
serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm to the child.
34
  
Thus, by adding the no harm standard to the Statute, the Court provided the constitutionally 
required special deference and added protection for parents’ familial privacy interests.     
Even though the D.C. court reinforced the legislative and constitutional boundaries 
protecting parents’ privacy interests, it did not abandon its former recognition that post adoption 
agreements, allowing continued contact between biological relatives and adoptive parents, 
particularly where a child is adopted by a relative or stepparent, are permissible.
35
  The Court has 
advised that under those circumstances, the agreements should be entered into “with full 
counseling and advice, and must be completely voluntary and mutual, and in the best interests of 
the child.”36  Until D.C., however, the Court had not gone as far as to judicially enforce these 
types of agreements or even express a willingness to do so, in the absence of a statutory 
                                                          
31
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 574-75 (citing Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (The case involved a custody dispute between a 
fit biological father and the maternal grandparents of the child. The court reversed the lower court’s decision 
awarding custody to the grandparents after it applied the best interest standard to the circumstances of the case. The 
Court held that applying the best interest standard in a case where the parent is fit constituted an incursion on the 
constitutional imperative of family autonomy.)). 
32
 Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 115 (citing Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 248 (2000)). 
33
 New Jersey Div. of Youth snd Family Servs. v. N.J., 2011 WL 446082, 3-4 (App. Div. Feb. 10, 2011). 
34
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 574-75 (citing Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 117 (2003)).  
35
 In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419, 426-27 (Ch. Div. 1979) (Granting the children an 
independent privilege to maintain contact with their natural father after they were adopted by their step-father.). 
36
 In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 362-63(1999) (citing Katterman v. DiPiazza, 151 N.J. Super 209 
(App. Div. 1990)). 
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provision granting such authority.
37
  Nonetheless, the D.C. court seemed to suggest in its dicta 
that these types of arrangements or agreements should be particularly considered by the adoptive 
parents, whether a biological relative or not, of older children who may have strong bonds with 
their siblings, as those are “the only siblings with the potential to vault the harm threshold.”38   
In its opinion, the D.C. court described circumstances under which sibling visits may be 
compelled against the wishes of a non-relative adoptive parent.  
For example, a case in which pre-teen siblings, raised together in the same 
household, deeply entwined in each other's lives, are removed due to abuse or 
neglect.  If one is adopted by a non-relative and the other taken in by his 
grandmother, it seems likely to us that denial of the sibling's application to visit 
his adopted brother would satisfy the harm threshold.
39
  
The circumstances described by the Court are more likely than not to be a reality for a large 
proportion of children of all ages who are in foster care.
40
  It is not uncommon for sibling groups 
to be separated while they are in out-of-home care because of the challenges in finding resource 
families able to accommodate them all together.
41
  And because it is an even greater challenge 
                                                          
37
 In re Guardianship of KHO, 161 N.J. 362-63 (1999) (citing Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473 (quoting 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate, No. 685 (1993))). 
38
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 577. 
39
 Id. at 574-75.  
40
 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Sibling Issues in Foster Care and Adoption: A Bulletin for Professionals 1-
15, 1 (December 2006), http://www.camptobelong-ga.org/pdf/siblingissues.pdf (last visited 4/5/13) (“A substantial 
proportion of the approximately 70 percent of children in foster care who have siblings in care are not placed with 
those siblings.”); see also National Resource Center for Permanency and Family Connections (NRCPFC), Sibling 
Placement: The Importance of the Sibling Relationship for Children in Foster Care 1-10, 3 (2012), http:// 
www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/information_packets/Sibling_Placement.pdf (last visited on 
4/16/13) [hereinafter The Importance of Sibling Relationship for Children in Foster Care] (citing R.L. Hedgar, 
Sibling Placement in Foster Care and Adoption: An Overview of International Research, CHILDREN AND YOUTH 
SERVICES IN REVIEW 27, 717-739 (2005) (‘The National Adoption Information Clearinghouse estimates that 65-
85% of U.S. foster children come from sibling groups, and studies of siblings in the child welfare system suggests 
that 60% to 73% of U.S. foster children have siblings who also enter foster care.’)). 
41
 The Center for the Study of Social Policy (CSSP), Progress of the New Jersey Department Children and Families, 
Period XII Monitoring Report for Charlie and Nadine H. v. Christie 1-161, 84 (Dec. 12, 2012), 
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for child welfare agencies to secure adoptive homes for sibling groups consisting of four or more 
children, it is less likely that the children in those sibling groups will be adopted by the same 
family.
42
   
Despite the commonality of sibling separation in foster care, many of them should 
theoretically be able to overcome the harm threshold provided they have an existing bond prior 
to entering placement, given the Child Placement Act’s emphasis on preserving sibling bonds 
and the Division’s affirmative obligation to nurture them.  However, because the children’s 
ability to remain connected and preserve their relationships is dependent on the Division’s 
systemic soundness and ability to meet its obligations under the Child Placement Act and 
settlement agreement,
43
 the possibility that they will be able to actually clear the requisite harm 
threshold is likely to become increasingly remote the longer they remain in out-of-home care.
44
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.state.nj.us/dcf/welfare/federal/EMARGOEDFINALNJReportPeriodXIIDecember2012.pdf (last visited 
4/5/13) (“Between the months of January and June 2012, a monthly range of 46 to 52 percent of children had 
monthly visits with their sibling when they were not placed together. For example, in June 2012 there were 2,595 
children in placement who had at least one sibling who did not reside in the same household as them. Of the 2,595 
children, 1,343 (52%) children had a visit with their siblings during the month. Performance, while improving, is 
still substantially lower than the final target of 85 percent.”). 
42
 NRCPFC, Sibling Placement, supra note 39, at 3 (citing K. Washington, Research Review: Sibling Placement in 
Foster Care: A Review of the Evidence, CHILD AND FAMILY SOCIAL WORK 12, 426-33, 431(2007) (‘Studies show that 
larger sibling groups are more likely than smaller groups to be placed separately, not only because fewer foster 
homes are willing to accept large groups of children, but also because large sibling groups are less likely to enter 
foster care at the same time.’); see also Child Welfare Information Gateway, Sibling Issues in Foster Care and 
Adoption: A Bulletin for Professionals 1 -15, 8 ( December 2006), 
 http://www.camptobelong-ga.org/pdf/siblingissues.pdf  (last visited 4/5/13) (“In some cases of separated siblings, 
foster parents may want to adopt only the sibling placed with them. Workers are put in the unenviable position of 
choosing the lesser of two evils—allowing the child to be adopted without his or her siblings, or keeping the child in 
foster care until a family can be found who will adopt all of the siblings.”).  
43
 Children’s Rights, New Jersey (Charlie and Nadine H. v. Christie) http:// www.childrensrights.org/reform-
campaigns/legal-case/new-jersey/ ( last visited on 4/19/13) (“Children’s Rights filed [a] class action lawsuit in 1999 
on behalf of more than 11,000 children in New Jersey’s child welfare system. In 2003 — following the much 
publicized death of Faheem Williams and the discovery of his two starving siblings, children known to the state’s 
Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) — a landmark settlement agreement mandating sweeping reforms 
was reached, but initially yielded few results.”); see also New Jersey Department of Children and Families (DCF), 
Child Welfare Reform, Modified Settlement Agreement, http://www.state.nj.us/dcf/about/welfare/modified/ (last 
visited on 4/19/13) (Identifying the State’s critical services in need of improvements under the imposed reform of 
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 Like many other child welfare agencies throughout the United States, the Division 
struggles with fulfilling its responsibility to provide children under their care with the continued 
visitations and familial contact mandated by statutes and necessary, in most cases, to the 
children’s well-being and the family units’ preservation.45  As a result, sibling relationships are 
often neglected for varying reasons and the children become less involved in each other’s lives 
potentially diluting their bonds and ability to overcome the harm threshold the longer they are 
under state care and in separate placements.  Unfortunately, irrespective of the cause of their 
separation and their inability to remediate the circumstances, siblings ultimately bear the burden 
of overcoming the no harm standard, which the Court made clear, is a “stringent one that cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Modified Settlement Agreement (MSA) are improvements in the delivery of services that “help keep families 
together, reunite families that are separated, address the well-being of children in out of home care…”).  
44
 HARRY J. APONTE, BREAD & SPIRIT: THERAPY WITH THE NEW POOR: DIVERSITY OF RACE, CULTURE AND 
VALUES 74-75 (1994) (“Family boundaries become porous to the institutional environment in the form of agencies 
that assume responsibility for and care of these families. These social welfare agencies, mental health clinic, and 
other community institutions become part of their daily lives. Unfortunately, the service provider network usually 
does not coordinate its efforts with the families and often becomes another disorganizing force in their lives. In its 
eagerness to help, the network of agencies more often than not also drains away the control families and 
communities have over their lives. The Institutional network inadvertently substitutes its policies for a family’s and 
its community’s values, and its bureaucracy for their social structure.”).  
45
 New Jersey Department of Children and Families, Child Welfare Reform Modified Settlement Agreement, supra 
note 41; see also Children’s Rights, News Events Blog: New Data, Same Tragic Story: Oklahoma’s Deep 
Dysfunction Threatens its Vulnerable Children, http://www.childrensrights.org/news-events/cr-blog/new-data-same-
tragic-story-oklahomas-deep-dysfunction-threatens-its-vulnerable-children/ (last visited 4/16/13) (“Family visits, 
which are so crucial to kids in foster care, were not completed more than 85 percent of the time, and 22 percent of 
kids with siblings didn’t see their brothers or sisters for an entire YEAR.”); Tennessee (Brian A. v. Bredesen), New 
Report: Tennessee Maintains Vital Improvements for Kids in Foster Care, but Significant Challenges Remain 
http://www.childrensrights.org/news-events/press/new-report-tennessee-maintains-vital-improvements-for-kids-in-
foster-care-but-significant-challenges-remain/ (last visited 4/16/13) (Tennessee’s Department of Children’s Services 
(DCS) must make significant improvements such as “ensuring more participation from families in planning for 
children’s safe and permanent exit from state custody, and greatly increasing opportunities for children in foster care 
to visit with their birth parents and their brothers and sisters.”); see APONTE,  supra note 43 at 73-74 (“[It ] is 
axiomatic that children are the individual mirrors for both the contentment and the distress of their families. The 
harmony or disharmony in the family as a whole will also affect every relationship within the family, facilitating or 
impeding connections among family members. Moreover, the social conditions of a community will support or 
undermine families and their individual members.”). 
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likely be satisfied by siblings who have had no connection to each other or by those whose bonds 
are flaccid, or worse, toxic.”46   
 The importance of preserving preexisting relationship bonds for children in foster care, 
including those who are adopted, has been recognized by the Court for some time.  In New 
Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. S.S., the Court urged the Legislature to “weigh the 
importance of maintaining sibling relationships in the post adoption context against the need for 
protecting parental autonomy of the new family unit, and ensuring the success of the adoption 
system,” in light of the goals of the Child Placement Act, the Visitation Statute and the Adoption 
Act.
47
   
There, the Court acknowledged the uniqueness and value sibling relationships have 
generally and for children in foster care placement specifically, describing them as “‘strong 
[bonds] that are, in most cases, irreplaceable.’”48  In agreeing with past courts and social science 
scholars, it acknowledged that “‘[a] sibling relationship can be an independent emotionally 
supportive factor for children in ways quite distinctive from other relationships, and there are 
benefits and experiences that a child  reaps from a relationship with his or her brother(s) or 
sister(s) which truly cannot be derived from any other.’”49  According to the Court and the 
mental health scholarship it relied on, sibling bonds do not have a natural expiration and their 
                                                          
46
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 575-76. 
47
 New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. S.S., 187 N.J. 556, 564-65 (2006). 
48
 Id. at 560-61 (quoting L. v. G., N.J.Super. 385, 395 (Ch.Div. 1985)). 
49
 Id.  
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disruption and abrupt ending could have a negative impact that lasts a lifetime where the benefit 
of lifelong companionship and emotional security could have otherwise existed.
50
   
Similarly, in D.C., the Court emphasized that “[m]aintaining sibling relationships can 
provide a sense of stability in the lives of abused children placed outside of their natural 
homes.”51  It reasoned that if sibling bonds are “important in healthy families, they are critical to 
children who experience chaotic circumstances.  Indeed, children who have been abused or 
neglected, or whose families have been ripped apart, face heightened levels of emotional stress 
and, in such circumstances, they learn very early to depend on and cooperate with each other to 
cope with their common problems.”52  The amplified importance of those ties for children in 
foster care can be attributable to the multiple losses of significant relationships they so often 
experience leaving their relationship to each other as potentially the only source for a continuing 
significant relationship.
53
  Separating them under those circumstances, whether they are 
“temporarily or permanently removed from their parents can severely intensify grief and trauma. 
In some cases sibling separations can be even more traumatic than separation from parents.”54 
                                                          
50
 Id. at 560-61 (quoting Ellen Marrus, “Where Have You Been, Fran?” The Right of Siblings to Seek Court Access 
to Override Parental Denial of Visitation 66 TENN. L.REV. 977, 987 (1999)). 
51
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 561-62 (citing New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. S.S., 187 N.J. 560-61).  
52
 Id.  
53
 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Siblings Issues in Foster Care and Adoption: Sibling Relationships in 
Abusive or Neglectful Families (2006), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pub/siblingissues/index.cfm (last visited 
4/5/13) (“While sibling relationships in particular families experiencing adverse situations do not always 
compensate for other deficits, research has validated that for many children, sibling relationships do promote 
resilience—for example, a young child’s secure attachment to an older sibling can diminish the impact of adverse 
circumstances such as parental mental illness or loss.”). 
54
 National Resource for Permanency and Family Connections, Information Packet: Siblings in Out-of-Home Care 
1-24, 3 (December 2005), 
http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/information_packets/siblings.pdf (last visited 4/6/13);  see 
also Office of Child Advocate Report, Adolescents in New jersey’s Foster Care System: An Assessment of Case 
Practice and Recommendations for Reform 1-38 (January 6, 2006),  
http://www.nj.gov/childadvocate/publications/PDFs/1ATP_Report_Final_010606.pdf  (last visited 4/16/13) (The 
Office of the Child Advocate (OCA) conducted a case file review of approximately 68 adolescent youth who were 
in out-of-home placements and found that among other things, many of the youth who were surveyed experienced 
trauma both before and after placement but little was done to address it.   
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There are many who go even further and argue that siblings have a constitutional right to 
their relationships with one another and that perhaps the recognition of such a right would 
potentially protect them against the added trauma of being separated.  For example, in S.S., the 
question before the Court was whether the courts or the Division had an affirmative duty in the 
post adoption context to ensure that sibling contacts were maintained.
55
  In that case, amicus 
curiae New Jersey Child Advocate in support of the law guardian's position, argued that siblings, 
“even when adopted by separate families, possess a right of visitation—a right to associate with 
one another guaranteed by Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution.”56  The case 
involved a 4-year old, the youngest of a sibling group of five, who since birth had been living 
with a foster family that was willing to adopt her.  Prior to the termination of her mother’s rights, 
she was having visitations with her four older siblings, all of whom were already adopted by 
another family.
57
  The Court declined to reach the issue of whether the children had a 
constitutional right to visitation post adoption, since it was not genuinely in controversy at that 
time.
58
  The Court found that the child’s visits with her siblings were not in jeopardy because the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Children in out-of-home placement across the country are, in many instances, dually traumatized. 
The first type of trauma often comes by the acts or omissions of a parent, relative or guardian 
whom the child knows as his or her caregiver; the second type comes by the act of removal and 
separation from the familiar. Failure to adequately recognize and address these experiences in a 
systematic and ongoing fashion with all youth upon removal to substitute care sets the stage for 
future instability. Unless addressed through early assessment and, where appropriate, counseling, 
youth who have been victimized and/or removed from the home are left ever more vulnerable to 
ponder, sometimes without resolution, life-altering questions about how they first came to be in 
foster care and why. Once in foster care, the probability of continued and new trauma is high. 
With every change in placement or reassignment of case managers, feelings of loss and separation 
may occur.  
Id. at. 18). 
55
 New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. S.S., 187 N.J. 558-59.   
56
 New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services v. S.S., 187 N.J. 558-59.   
57
 Id. at 558-59. 
58
 Id. at 558-59. 
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respective adoptive families, acting in the children’s best interests, had been cooperating by 
allowing visits to take place without any court intervention.
59
   
Although D.C. also involved siblings’ rights to visitation, it was not argued that they had 
a constitutional right to visitation post adoption.  Instead, the adult siblings of 5 year-old twins 
petitioned the Court for continued visits under the Visitation Statute post termination of the 
mother’s parental rights, while adoption was still pending.60  In that case, after the twin’s sister, 
Nellie, was denied approval as a kinship placement for them, the Division discontinued 
visitations.
61
  Nellie appealed her rejection as a viable placement option for the twins, and 
petitioned the lower court for visits in the meantime.
62
  Initially, the visits were approved since 
the foster mother was in agreement at the time but the lower court did not hold the Division 
responsible for arranging nor supervising the visits as required by the Child Placement Act.
63
  A 
month later however, the Division informed Nellie that the foster mother was no longer willing 
to facilitate visits with the twins.
64
  When Nellie attempted to enforce the prior visitation 
agreement via the courts, she was informed that she was not in a position to re-litigate the 
Division’s plan of foster home adoption for the twins, and that visitation could not be ordered 
and would remain at the discretion of the foster mother.
65
   
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decision and remanded for an 
expedited evidentiary hearing.  It held that post termination of parental rights, siblings in foster 
care continued to have a right to the benefit of the Child Placement Act’s presumption of 
                                                          
59
 Id. at 563-64. 
60
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 550. 
61
 Id. at 554-55. 
62
 Id. 
63
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 556-57. 
64
 Id. at 556-57. 
65
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545, 556-57 (2010). 
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continued sibling contact and visitations.
66
  In addition, it held that post adoption Nellie was 
entitled to an opportunity under the Visitation Statute, to demonstrate by expert and factual 
evidence that the twins would suffer harm if the visits were denied.
67
  Among the factors the 
court below was charged with considering was whether or not Nellie was ever a full-time 
caregiver for the twins,
68
 the relationship, if any, existing among the siblings and the effect 
denial of the visitation would have on the petitioning siblings.
69
  In the Court’s view, if harm is 
demonstrated, then the “diminution of parental autonomy would be a proper exchange for the 
protection of the child[ren] under [it’s] constitutional parens patriae jurisdiction.”70   
Prior to D.C., the court had not recognize a sibling’s standing to petition the court for 
post adoption visitation nor had it addressed visitation post termination of parental rights.  In 
establishing that the Child Placement Act continues to protect sibling relationships post 
termination of parental rights, the Court effectively postponed the emotional consequences 
associated with legally severing a child’s preexisting relationships with her siblings.71  However, 
the Court acknowledged that avoiding the additional loss beyond adoption would be an “uphill 
battle” for those who try to maintain ties with their siblings over an adoptive parent’s objection.  
A feat likely to be most challenging for children in foster care as they are often times powerless 
to do anything about sustaining familial contacts even prior to the termination of parental 
rights.
72
 
                                                          
66
 Id. at 565-66. 
67
 Id. at 574-75. 
68
 N.J.S.A. § 9:7-1(b)(8)(c) (“[I]t shall be prima facie evidence that visitation is in the child’s best interest if the 
applicant had, in the past, been a full-time caretaker for the child.”). 
69
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 575-76. 
70
 Id. at 577. 
71
 In re the Adoption by W.P. and M.P., 163 N.J. 173-74. 
72 New Jersey Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect Staffing and Oversight Review Subcommittee (NJTFCAN), 
Sixth Annual Report to Governor Chris Christie and the New Jersey Legislature, Proceeding and Findings for the 
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Additionally, by injecting the no harm standard into the Visitation Statute, the Court 
grounded its authority to enforce and impose post adoption visitation agreements in its 
constitutional parens patriae jurisdiction in the absence of legislative authority.  At the same 
time, the Court appealed to the putative adoptive parents’ altruism by asking that they embrace 
the children’s unique circumstances as they are and not pretend that “a deep bond between 
siblings who have been adopted does not exist.”73  Its appeal and expressed willingness to 
judicially impose visitations, although under very narrowly defined circumstances to prevent 
additional harm to a child, is perhaps as far as the Court is able to go to protect sibling bonds 
post adoption without compromising the constitutionally and legislatively protected rights of the 
adoptive parents.   
III. Siblings Constitutional Rights to Visitation 
In SS, the Court did not reach the constitutional question of whether siblings have a 
constitutional right to visitation or association with one another, and D.C. was decided under 
the State’s Visitation Statute and the Court’s constitutional parens patriae jurisdiction to protect 
children from harm.  It has been argued however, that siblings have a separate liberty interest to 
family privacy founded on either the Federal Constitution’s First Amendment right to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
period of July 1, 2011 – June 30, 2012, 8 (2012) 
http:www.nj.gov/news/reportsnewsletters/taskforce/SORSreport_Jun12.pdf (last visited on 4/4/13) (“[E]ngaging 
families in a way that enables them to successfully reunite continues to be a challenge. One of the most important 
aspects of family reunification is quality, consistent visitation between parents and children and siblings while 
children are in out-of-home placement. The monitor’s data, however, show that New Jersey’s visitation practices are 
not meeting this goal. As a result, SORS will delve deeper into this issue in the coming year to look more closely at 
ways DCF can improve both the quantity and quality of visitation among family members in the child welfare 
system.”). 
73
 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545, 576-77 (2010). 
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association or the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause right to privacy but, thus far, no 
court has held that a liberty interest exists on either ground.
74
  
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the issue but denied 
certiorari in Hugo P. v. George P.,
75
 where it was asked to determine whether or not siblings 
had a constitutional right to family integrity similar to the one it recognized between a parent 
and child in cases such as Stanley v. Illinois
76
 and Santosky v. Kramer.
77
  In the underlying case 
Adoption of Hugo, after weighing many factors, the trial court found that the benefit of keeping 
Hugo with his foster mother, who had already adopted his sister, and “avoiding the trauma of 
the loss of these supportive people,” was outweighed by the long-term benefit of moving him 
“into a family of relatives who [were] better able to help him meet his potential.”78  There, the 
lower court did not give any special weight to Hugo’s relationship with his sister but did 
include it as one of the factors it considered in determining what was in his best interests.  
                                                          
74
 Randi Mandelbaum, Delicate Balances: Assessing the Needs and Rights of Siblings in Foster Care to Maintain 
Their Relationships Post- Adoption, 41 N.M. L. REV. 1, 8 (2011).  
75
 Adoption of Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516 (1998), cert denied Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999). 
76
 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972) (Holding that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, an unwed father was entitled to hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children could be taken 
from him in dependency proceeding.); see also Caban v. Mohamed, 441 U.S. 380(1979) (Where the Court held 
there was no demonstrable legitimate state interest in the gender-based distinction which did not permit unwed 
fathers to adopt their children without the mother’s consent. There the putative father demonstrated substantial 
interest in his children as he had been providing both emotional and financial support.); but see Quillion v. Walcot, 
434 U.S. 246 (1977), reh’ denied 435 U.S. 918 (1978); (A unanimous court held that a putative father, who had no 
contact with his biological child, had no constitutional right to oppose the adoption of that child.). 
77
 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745-46 (1982) (“White, held that under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, unwed father was entitled to hearing on his fitness as parent before his children could be 
taken from him in dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois after the death of the children's natural 
mother. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)The fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to 
the State. A parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest. When the State 
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.”); but 
see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249 (1983) (Holding the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses did not require that a putative father, who had not established a relationship with his biological 
child nor registered with the putative father register, receive notice and a hearing before the child can be adopted. 
“[H]is interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. But 
the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent protection.”). 
78
 Adoption of Hugo, 700 N.E.2d 516, 522 (1998). 
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By contrast, the Troxel court determined that a parent’s fundamental right in their 
relationship to their children did required special weight when their decisions are challenged by 
a nonparent third party.  The plurality in that case, established that granting visitations to a third 
party against the wishes of a fit parent without giving any special weight to the parent’s 
decision was an unconstitutional infringement on her fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of her children.
79
  The Court however, did not reach 
the question of whether the Due Process Clause requires that all third party visitation statutes  
impose a showing of harm or potential harm as a condition precedent for granting the sought 
after visitations.  Instead, its decision rested on the challenged statute’s unconstitutional 
overbreadth and application.
80
  Additionally, the Court opted not to establish any bright line 
rule regarding third party visitations as “much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on 
a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes 
violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.”81 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens raised the issue that although the Court had not “yet had 
occasion to elucidate the nature of a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or 
family-like bonds, it seem[ed] extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have 
fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have 
these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.”82  Similarly in 
other contexts, the Justices have recognized children’s liberty interests apart from those of their 
parents.
83
  For example in Yoder, Justice Douglas argued in his dissent that apart from the 
                                                          
79
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 71 (2000). 
80
 Id. at 58. 
81
 Id. at 73-74. 
82
 Id. at 88-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243-44 (1972) ( Douglas, J., dissenting in part): 
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parents’ right to inculcate their children in their religion of choice and the State’s interest in the 
education of its citizenry, the children’s right to free exercise was also implicated in that case.84  
He argued that if a child’s desires conflicted with his parent’s and he was mature enough to 
express them, it would be an invasion of the child's rights to permit imposition of the parents’ 
desires without “canvassing his views.”85  “[If] an Amish child desires to attend high school, 
and is mature enough to have that desire respected, the State may well be able to override the 
parents' religiously motivated objections.”86  
Generally the Court has recognized that, although unspecified, the individual liberty 
protected by the Bill of Rights necessarily includes the ability to form and preserve certain 
kinds of “highly personal relationships” without unjustified State interference.87  “Moreover, 
the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals 
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these 
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Recent cases, however, have clearly held that the children themselves have constitutionally 
protectible interests. These children are ‘persons' within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. We have so 
held over and over again. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) we extended the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in a state trial of a 15-year-old boy. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), we 
held that ‘neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.’ In In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), we held that a 12-year-old boy, when charged with an act which would 
be a crime if committed by an adult, was entitled to procedural safeguards contained in the Sixth 
Amendment. 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), we 
dealt with 13-year-old, 15-year-old, and 16-year-old students who wore armbands to public schools 
and were disciplined for doing so. We gave them relief, saying that their First Amendment rights had 
been abridged. ‘Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons' under our Constitution. They 
are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect 
their obligations to the State.’  
Id. at 511. 
84
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (In that case, the Court held that the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments prevented a state from compelling that Amish parents send their children to high school after 
graduating from the eighth grade.). 
85
 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
86
 Id. 
87
 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984). 
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to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”88  “[F]reedom of personal 
choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”89  
In the foster care context the Court did not find a constitutional liberty interest in statutorily 
created foster family relationships.
90
  The Court reasoned that “the liberty interest in family 
privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law, but in 
intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in ‘this Nation's history and tradition.’”91 
While it did not deny that in some cases liberty interests may arise from positive-law source, it 
indicated that in those instances it would be appropriate to determine the parties’ expectations 
and entitlements from the state law.
92
  However, it did indicate that in a situation where a child 
has been living with a foster family for several years and it is the only family she has ever 
known, “it is natural that the foster family should hold the same place in the emotional life of 
the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing functions, as a natural family.”93  
In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Court addressed the constitutional protection warranted by 
certain personal affiliations such as those attending to the "creation and sustenance of a 
family—marriage, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail; childbirth, e.g., Carey v. Population Services 
International; the raising and education of children, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families; and cohabitation with one's relatives e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland.”94  In 
determining which other types of relationships may have claim to constitutional protection 
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 Id. at 619-20. 
89
 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974). 
90
 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
91
 Id. at 845-46 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S., at 503 (1932). 
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 Id. 
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 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 844-45. 
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 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 619-20. 
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limiting the States authority to interfere with an individual's freedom to enter into those 
associations, the court advised a careful assessment of their objective characteristics.
95
  Similar 
to familial relationships, the attributes these associations are likely to have are their “relative 
smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and 
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a general matter, only 
relationships with these sorts of qualities are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to 
an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.”96  
 Considering some of the Court’s decisions and dicta, the arguments made for the 
constitutional protection of sibling relationships, particularly those existing prior to out-of-
home placement, under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to familial privacy and 
the First Amendment freedom of association certainly seem to be justified.  If a foster family 
situation could plausibly ripen into holding a similar place to that of a natural family in the life 
of a foster child, and certain nonfamilial associations that are likened to a family may enjoy a 
constitutionally protected level of freedom from State interference, it seems only logical that 
siblings relationships, which are the fruit of the natural family, should have similar 
constitutional protections.   
Unfortunately, even if there were a constitutionally protected right to association with 
siblings or family privacy for children, it is not likely to be absolute, nor immune from State 
interference. Just as parents’ right to family integrity may be subject to limited interference by 
the State, where its interests in the health, safety and welfare of its citizenry is concerned, so 
too will sibling rights be subject to limitations, particularly since the need for foster care 
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 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). 
96
 Id. 
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placement is essentially the State’s exercise of its constitutional powers in protecting its 
citizens.  The Court has always recognized an inherent right to family autonomy when it comes 
to parent-child relationships, yet once a child is placed in foster care that autonomy becomes 
significantly limited and the State’s intrusion in the realm of family privacy becomes most 
prevalent. So much so, that there is no guarantee parents will be able to even visit with their 
children with any real frequency despite the constitutional and legislative provisions in place to 
protect their bonds and interests and the threat of termination of parental rights looming over 
them.
97
  By comparison, sibling relationships, which do not enjoy the special weight afforded 
to parent-child relationships when challenged, are not likely to be any less vulnerable to State 
intrusion even if it were afforded the same level of constitutional protections once the children 
enter foster care.    
IV. Conclusion 
Despite the currently recognized importance of sibling relationships by the social scientists, 
state and federal legislatures, and courts all over the United States, and the lasting negative 
effects associated with their loss, children in foster care are often separated while in placement 
and permanently after they have been adopted. Even with the enactment of statutes on both the 
state and federal levels requiring that reasonable efforts are made to place siblings together 
during their stay in out-of-placements, less than 50 percent of children who also have siblings 
living in foster care are placed with their siblings.
98
  This phenomenon is not specific to the 
Division in New Jersey alone, as it is the same for many child welfare agencies in other parts of 
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 See generally New Jersey DCF, Modfied Settle Agreement, supra note 41; see also Children’s Rights News Blog: 
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supra note 45. 
98
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the country.  It is argued that a possible solution would be the recognition of a constitutional 
right to sibling association under the First Amendment or a right to family privacy for children 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  However, just as parental rights to 
family integrity are subject to State interference when the State’s interests in the health, safety, 
and welfare of its citizens are concerned, so too will children’s rights be subject to similar 
limitation, and even more in the foster care context where those State interests are particularly 
implicated. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has advocated in its past decisions that the Legislature 
should weigh the importance of sibling relationships post adoption with the need to protect the 
familial autonomy of the newly created adoptive families.  And, in its most recent case, D.C., 
the Court appealed to the putative adoptive parents of older children to consider the 
continuation of preexisting sibling bonds as they are not empty slates and [l]ike all of us, … is 
the agglomeration of all the relationships and happenstances, good and bad, of his or her 
lifetime.
99
  The Court’s opinions indicate that in its view, preservation of sibling bonds would 
be best addressed through State legislation and the parties involved.  
Review of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions seems to also support this view.  In Troxel, the 
Court left open how State’s should handle third party petitions for visitation over a parent’s 
objection imposing only the required special weight to parental decisions absent a showing of 
unfitness.
100
  While in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, it distinguished between the inherent 
family rights that come from a natural family and those created by statute and contracts in a 
foster family situation.  But, it also pointed out in that case that a positive-law source may give 
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rise to a liberty interest, where the expectations and entitlement of the parties may be delineated 
in the state law itself.
101
   
Perhaps somewhere between Troxel and Smith is a possible solution for preserving sibling 
relationships.  Adoption law is created by state statutes and the rights of the adoptive parents 
arise from that positive-law source.  If we were to look to that law source for the expectations 
and entitlements of the parties who are adopting the uniquely situated children like the ones 
described by the Court in D.C., that have preexisting sibling relationships then foster adoptive 
parents can assess early on whether they will be able to accommodate those particular children.  
By addressing this issue sooner than later it will avoid the incursion on the parental autonomy 
post adoption and exposing adoptees to the additional trauma of losing another significant 
relationship or having to choose between their sibling and adoptive family. This can only be 
accomplished via careful research and legislative provisions.  
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